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TAGS: [BO](#) [KACT](#) [KZ](#) [PARM](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 007: RESPONSE TO RFG-003 ON
ELIMINATION MONITORING

REF: GENEVA 000081 (SFO-GVA-VIII-0051)

Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting ASSISTANT SECRETARY, VCI.
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (S) Guidance: In Ref, delegation outlines two possible options for reaching agreement on monitoring of solid-fueled first stage ICBM, solid-fueled first stage SLBM, and mobile ICBM launcher eliminations. Delegation is instructed to pursue a variant which is a hybrid of Option 1 and Option 2 from Ref. Under this approach, each year the Russians would create two batches of eliminated items for possible Type Two inspection by the United States at both the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher Core facilities (for a total of four batches). Each batch would contain approximately 25 percent of the year's output of eliminated items for that facility. If the United States elected not to inspect these 25 percent batches, the eliminated items would still be displayed in the open for 60 days for NTM viewing prior to their final disposition. Delegation should note that the 60-day window for displaying 100 percent of eliminated items in the open for monitoring by NTM is critical and must be part of any final agreement.

12. (S) If the United States chose not to conduct one or more of the announced "batch" inspections under this alternative, the U.S. would have the right to conduct a full Type Two inspection (in lieu of each "batch" inspection not executed) during the periods of the treaty year when solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs as well as mobile ICBM launchers were incrementally being eliminated, notified as available for inspection, and displayed in the open in small groups. The conduct of Type Two inspections would entail full Type Two inspection rights to inspect the entire Core facilities, at both Votkinsk and Piban'shur, at times chosen by the inspecting Party. In no case would either facility be subject to more than two inspections each year (both announced "batch" inspections and regular Type Two inspections).

13. (S) As noted in Ref, this approach is predicated on Russia providing site diagrams for the Votkinsk and Piban'shur facilities that were the same as those provided under the START Treaty and on their willingness to make available all items subject to inspection within the inspectable area during such an inspection. This proposal would allow the United States to confirm the accuracy of all the data declared for the facilities and to confirm the elimination of all items being displayed in the open in accordance with a 60-day display window using a team of up to 10 inspectors.

14. (S) Should Russia reject this approach, delegation is authorized to pursue Option 2, as described in Ref.

End guidance.
CLINTON